

Citizens' Rapprochement by the

# Local Peace Constituencies

bi-communal Conflict Resolution Trainer Group

## in Cyprus

Oliver Wolleh

## Author

OLIVER WOLLEH, Dr. phil. (des.), associate researcher at the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Special interests: Strategies of civilian conflict management and the role of NGOs in peace-building processes.

## Publications related to Cyprus:

*Peacebuilding Aktivitäten der bikommunalen „Conflict Resolution Trainer“ Gruppe in Zypern*, Berghof Occasional Paper, Nr. 12, Berlin, 1997.

*Gesellschaftliche Vertrauensbildung: Über die schwierige Anerkennung in Zypern*, in: Gewaltfreie Aktion Heft 115/116, 30. Jahrg., 1. + 2. Quartal 1998.

*Bürgergruppen für den Frieden in Zypern* (zus. mit Katie Economidou) in: Evers, Tilman (Hrsg.), „Ziviler Friedensdienst - Fachleute für den Frieden“, S. 330-338, Opladen, 2000.

*Cyprus: A Civil Society Caught up in the Question of Recognition*, in: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (ed.), *Searching for Peace in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia*, to be published in June 2001.

## Study

This study was initially written for the „Reflecting On Peace Practice Project“ conducted by The Collaborative for Development Action (Cambridge, MA) and the Life & Peace Institute (Uppsala). The present text has been revised and supplemented with new information. I would like to thank the project management for the right to publish this study as well as the members of the Cyprus Consortium. Last but not least I show appreciation towards the people whose work has been examined and who were kind enough to share their ideas with me.

Berghof Report Nr. 8

March 2001

© Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

## Contact Address:

Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

Altensteinstraße 48a

14195 Berlin / Germany

## Via Internet:

<http://www.berghof-center.de>

## **Table of Contents**

Introduction .....	1
<b>1 The Cyprus Conflict.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2 The Development of the Trainer Group on the Background of the Cyprus Consortium and the US Network.....</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1 The Trainer Group as an Internal Actor .....	12
2.2 The First Phase of Proliferation .....	13
2.3 The Temporary Disruption of Activities .....	16
2.4 The Second Phase of Proliferation .....	17
<b>3 The Structure of the Bi-Communal Groups .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>4 The Dialogue in the Bi-Communal Groups.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>5 Obstacles for the Bi-Communal Process.....</b>	<b>23</b>
5.1 Obstacles in the Context of Encounters .....	23
5.2 Counterbalancing Interventions in the Context of Encounters .....	27
5.2.1 Meeting in the Middle.....	27
5.2.2 “Easy Access” Interventions.....	30
5.2.3 Checkpoint Interventions .....	32
5.3 Obstacles in the Context of Institutionalisation .....	33
<b>6 The Development Since 1997 .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>7 Lessons learned .....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>Appendix.....</b>	<b>49</b>

## Introduction

This Case study details the development and progress of a bi-communal Conflict Resolution Trainer Group on the divided island of Cyprus. The Trainer Group consists of 30 Greek and Turkish Cypriot members and can be defined as an internal grassroots structure aiming to initiate a range of peace-building projects. Its Greek Cypriot members live in the South, the Turkish Cypriot members in the North of the divided island.<sup>1</sup> Between 1994 and the end of 1997 the Trainer Group founded 25 bi-communal follow-up groups on “track-two” as well as on “track-one-and-a-half” level, initiated several projects and arranged “visits to the other side” for citizens.

The Trainer Group is remarkable in several respects. It can be described as the most important and citizen based rapprochement / peace-building group on Cyprus and through its network of facilitated bi-communal follow-up groups they created a process of dialogue and encounters which since the events in 1974 is unique in its intensity and extent. Apart from this, the Trainer Group uses an approach to conflict resolution in their work influenced by the Cyprus Consortium and the Cyprus Fulbright Commission. The close relations the Trainer Group has with foreign actors illuminate the possibilities and risks of such a partnership.

After the EU summit meeting in December 1997 in Luxembourg the Turkish-Cypriot leadership almost totally restricted the movement of Turkish Cypriots within well established places of encounter in the buffer zone. This ban lasted until the next EU summit in February 2000 in Helsinki. It affected the meetings of existing bi-communal groups and the established forms of bi-communal encounters. However, it did not totally suppress the commitment of the Trainer Group for peace and after, a shock phase, caused new forms of bi-communal activities to develop.

The information in this case study was gathered according to an inductive, interview based method that was strongly influenced by the Grounded Theory Approach. There were two phases of field studies. Firstly, in 1996 and 1997,

---

<sup>1</sup> With the exception of one Turkish Cypriot who lives in the South.

interviews were carried out in connection with the author's dissertation.<sup>2</sup> During this phase a total of 55 interviews were held with 62 persons. The interviewees were members of the Trainer Group, representatives of foreign organisations such as the Cyprus Consortium, the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, the United Nations, various foreign embassies, political observers and people who, like the Trainer Group, were, or had been in the past, involved in bi-communal activities.

In the summer of 2000 the author conducted a second series of interviews with 15 persons for the project "Reflecting on Peace Practice" (RPP). These interviews were focused on the evaluation of the developments since 1997 and on the additional specifics of the RPP study to the existing material. The interviewees were trainers, some fully active and others who had been partly active since the massive disruptions. Additionally, representatives of the political parties in the North and South were questioned and also representatives of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) and the Conflict Management Group (CMG).

The report begins with a short description of the historical development of the Cyprus conflict. The main part of the report deals with the origins and the development of the Trainer Group as one of the most successful social initiatives on Cyprus. The analysis focuses on the obstacles the Trainer Group encountered when implementing their initiative and on how the spectrum of activities of the Trainer Group could be broadened by the support of foreign actors.

---

2 Wolleh, Oliver: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen interner Akteure bei der Friedensbildung in geteilten Gesellschaften - Die Conflict Resolution Trainer Group in Zypern (1993 -1997) ["Abilities and limits of internal peacebuilding actors in divided societies - The Conflict Resolution Trainer Group in Cyprus (1993 - 1997)."], Ph.D. diss., Free University Berlin, (to be published 2001).

## 1 The Cyprus Conflict

The relationship between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus goes back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the Ottoman Empire conquered the island that at that time was ruled by the Venetians. The following three hundred years of Ottoman rule are considered a period of peaceful co-existence. When the British landed in 1878, they formally ended the Ottoman rule, and, in 1925 Cyprus became a British Crown Colony.

At the beginning of the nineteen-thirties, some island Greeks started a movement to unite Cyprus with the “motherland” Greece (*Enosis* in Greek). The British government, however, for strategic reasons was not prepared to give up the island and blocked the *Enosis*-plans by Greece and the Greek Cypriots.<sup>3</sup>

As a result, in 1955 the armed struggle for a union was started by the Greek Cypriot underground movement “EOKA” against the British colonial power. The British used Turkish Cypriot units against the EOKA as the Turkish community on the island rejected the union with Greece. During this time, apart from Turkish Cypriot police units, the first Turkish armed underground organisations such as “Volkan” and later “TMT” were formed who, with the support from Turkey and the permission of the British colonial administration, took up the fight against EOKA. In 1959/1960 the negotiations in Zurich and London between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey led to the independence of Cyprus. All three states became guarantors of the new Republic of Cyprus. In 1960, the majority of the island population and its political leadership found themselves in a political construct that did not correspond to their political ideas. While the armed struggle of the EOKA had aimed for the political union of Cyprus with Greece, the Turkish Cypriot underground organisations first fought for the prevention of *Enosis* and later for the division of the Island (*Taksim* in Turkish). Under these conditions the implementation of the young republic’s complicated, very detailed and clearly bi-communal constitution was only very difficult to realise.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> See Markides, Kyriacos C., 1977: *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Salem, Norma, 1992: *The Constitution of 1960 and its Failure*, in: Salem, Norma: *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, New York: St. Martin’s Press.

In 1963, President Makarios attempted to make thirteen constitutional changes to overcome the inner-political constitutional crisis and the blockade. He aimed to change the constitutional distribution of power between the ethnic groups giving the advantage to the Greek Cypriots. This was the trigger for violent inter-communal fighting during which about 1,000 Turkish and 200 Greek Cypriots were killed. The crisis led to the resignation of the Turkish Cypriot members of the government and to the formation of Turkish enclaves. In 1964 the so far quite mixed communities were divided politically and administratively. This also led to the involvement of the UN Security Council and the deployment of the UN Blue Helmets, the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNICYP).

Even though the demand for Enosis among the island Greeks increasingly lost political support after the military coup in Greece, the Greek Cypriot government and the developing Turkish Cypriot administration of the enclaves did not succeed in finding a solution for the constitutional crisis.<sup>5</sup>

On July 20<sup>th</sup> 1974, Turkish troops landed in reaction to the coup against President Makarios supported by the Greek Junta with the aim of Enosis. During the invasion, that occurred in two stages approximately 60,000 Turkish Cypriots fled from their enclaves to the North of the island controlled by the Turkish army, while 200,000 island Greeks fled into the South. To this day 1,619 Greek Cypriots, including civilians, are still missing. Since then, between 30,000 and 35,000 Turkish troops have been stationed in the North. Their withdrawal has been demanded by the United Nations in numerous resolutions.

In 1975 the Turkish Cypriots declared the “Turkish Federal State” and in 1983 the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) which to this day is only recognized by Turkey. Since 1964, the Greek Cypriot southern part of the island claims to be the only true representative of the Republic of Cyprus. The economic differences between the North and the South are marked.

There have been numerous attempts by UN General Secretaries to start negotiations but none of them has led to a solution. However, some inter-communal negotiations have been partly successful. In 1977 and 1979 both sides agreed on a “bi-communal”, “bi-zonal” and “federal” solution. But the positions of both parties

---

<sup>5</sup> See Crawshaw, Nancy, 1978: *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*. London: Allen & Unwin.

regarding the actual implementation of this formula diverge widely. While the Greek Cypriots and the mainland government in Athens aim for a federation with a strong central government in which the Turkish Cypriot population has a minority status, the Turkish Cypriot government strictly rejects the legal status as a minority and pleads for a model with a relatively weak central government and a strong federal state. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot party has time and again demanded a confederation.<sup>6</sup> Apart from these fundamental differences there has been no agreement regarding the presence of Turkish troops or the possible return of the refugees. The settlement of mainland Turks who have moved to the island since 1974 are equally controversial. The Greek side generally demands the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and settlers and wants an unrestricted return of all refugees; the Turkish Cypriot side pleads for a presence of Turkish troops and settlers and a very limited resettlement of Greek Cypriots, if at all.

Major trust-building measures initiated by the UN so far could not be implemented. The status quo on Cyprus is marked by a geographical separation of the Turkish and Greek ethnic groups into mostly ethnically homogeneous areas. A buffer zone controlled by one of the oldest UN peacekeeping missions (UNICYP) divides the Greek Cypriot southern part of the island (Republic of Cyprus) from the Turkish Cypriot northern part (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus - TRNC). There are almost no direct lines of communication between these two parts, nor any economic relationships.

In 1990, the EU approved the application of the Cyprus Government for membership. Since then, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been invited to participate as part of the official Cypriot delegation at the acceleration talks. However, the North stated that it will only participate as an independent state.

---

<sup>6</sup> Theophanous, Andreas, 1996: *The Political Economy Of A Federal Cyprus*. Nicosia: Intercollege Press. p. xiii.

## **2 The Development of the Trainer Group on the Background of the Cyprus Consortium and the US Network**

The bi-communal Conflict Resolution Trainer Group began to emerge in 1993 and took over two years to establish. It was the result of the co-operation between committed Cypriots as well as of foreign actors. They began as two separate groups in their respective communities (mono-communal phase) and developed into a group that met and acted on a bi-communal basis.

From Spring 1995 onwards approximately 30 people of the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group began to initiate projects of their own and to establish new bi-communal follow-up groups. By the end of 1997, there were 25 such groups and approximately 1,500 people had participated in bi-communal social activities.<sup>7</sup>

The development leading to the foundation of the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group was initially strongly influenced by the personal commitment of certain individuals. During the mono-communal phase, there was no direct permanent contact between the future trainers on both sides. The participation of the foreign actors was strongly influenced by the personal commitment of Louise Diamond.

Ms Diamond was first invited to Cyprus in 1992 by a Greek Cypriot woman residing in the US. The aim of this “fact finding mission” was to find out how much Ms. Diamond with her solid background as a trainer could contribute to the overall situation in Cyprus. For this purpose a series of informal talks were arranged with Greek and Turkish Cypriots who had previously taken part in Conflict Resolution Programmes.<sup>8</sup> Apart from this there were discussions and consultations with leading representatives of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, the American Center, the US Embassy, the United Nations on Cyprus and politicians from both sides.

---

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix: Overview of the Group Development

<sup>8</sup> These were mostly initiatives by Ronald J. Fisher and Leonard Doob. Fisher, Ronald J, 1994: Education And Peacebuilding in Cyprus: A Report On Two Conflict Analysis Workshops, Saskatoon/ Canada: University of Saskatchewan (Dep. of Psychology). Doob, L.W., 1974: A Cyprus workshop: an exercise in intervention methodology, in: Journal of Social Psychology vol. 94, (1974), pp. 161 - 178. Doob, L.W., 1976: A Cyprus

At that time, there were no bi-communal contacts on the societal level apart from the meetings in connection with the Nicosia Master Plan facilitated by UNHCR.<sup>9</sup> There was a lot of interest shown by some individuals in a possible training in Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management. Due to this, Ms. Diamond and her colleague John McDonald (of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, IMTD) and Members of the National Training Laboratories (NTL) regularly visited the island for the following two years.<sup>10</sup> The aim was to engender trust between the team of trainers and to present their methods by arranging lectures and conducting short workshops on issues of conflict management in both communities. All these activities happened in a mono-communal context.

The audience consisted of individual Cypriots who were committed to furthering peace. The participants were selected mainly by Cypriots in co-operation with the US team of trainers and was influenced by their personal and social background and experience. On the Greek Cypriot side there was one person affiliated to the Peace Centre Cyprus, on the Turkish Cypriot side there developed two interested groups consisting of leftwing and rightwing intellectuals who dealt separately with the organisers of the events. This separation was abolished after about nine months when the team of trainers made it clear to the groups that they were not prepared any more to carry out two workshops with different participants within the Turkish Cypriot community.<sup>11</sup> Even though the atmosphere between the two Turkish Cypriot groups was tense and confrontational, both groups accepted the fusion because it was considered a disgrace not to meet the Greek Cypriots as a unified Turkish Cypriot group in a possible bi-communal workshop. The two Turkish Cypriot groups unified in a process that was described by some of the interviewees as “Conflict resolution in the community”:

---

workshop: intervention methodology during a continuing crisis, in: *Journal of Social Psychology* vol. 98 (1976), pp. 143 - 44.

<sup>9</sup> See UNDP, United Nations Development Programme (ed.), 1984: *Nicosia Master Plan: Final Report Executive Summary*. Nicosia: UNDP, UNCHS [Habitat].; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ed.), 1995: *The Nicosia Sewage Project: A Plan For Nicosia A Strategy For The World*. Nicosia: UNHCR.; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ed.): *A Vision for the Future of Nicosia: A Partnership towards the Rehabilitation of Chrysaliniotissa and Arab Ahmet*. Nicosia: UNHCR.

<sup>10</sup> There was a total of eight journeys, mostly financed by the IMTD. See Institute For Multi-Track Diplomacy (ed.), 1995: *Initiative Report: Cyprus, March 2, IMTD, Washington, D.C.*

<sup>11</sup> See Interview (1), (35).

“It was as powerful as the bi-communal workshop. (...) They [the participants] have known each other for years, but they had never sat down and talked and had never acknowledged their common ground. They had made many assumptions about one another and their political views and were shocked to find out that they actually believed a lot of the same things and had only marginal differences.” (35:1)<sup>12</sup>

As a result of this workshop, the participants agreed to take part in a bi-communal workshop whose Turkish Cypriot participants consisted of politically leftwing and rightwing members equally. This could be considered an important condition for the bi-communal training.

The interest in these workshops remained strong and this led to the first bi-communal workshop in the second half of 1992 on initiative of the IMTD. By November 1992, the Bi-Communal Conflict Resolution Steering Committee (BSC) was founded as a direct result of a bi-communal workshop.<sup>13</sup> This meant that from then on there was an informal bi-communal committee organised by civilians which marked the beginning of the bi-communal phase leading to the development of the Trainer Group.

The Bi-Communal Steering Committee (BSC) had twelve members, six Greek Cypriot and six Turkish Cypriot participants of the workshops. It took on the task of co-ordinating all bi-communal peace building activities on Cyprus. At the time of its foundation this meant mainly the organisation and planning of Conflict Resolution Workshops, facilitated by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) and the National Training Laboratories (NTL). While the development of the contents was the responsibility of the American Trainers, it was the aim of the BSC to recruit new interested participants for the training programme.

In the summer of 1993, the IMTD and the NTL organised a ten day intensive training in conflict resolution in Oxford, England. This workshop proved important in several aspects. For one thing, it created a close personal relationship between the twenty participants. These participants called themselves “The Oxford Group” and after their return to Cyprus started meeting in the buffer zone. After only a few

---

<sup>12</sup> The first figure indicates the number of the interview.

<sup>13</sup> Bicomunal Conflict Resolution Steering Committee Cyprus (ed.), April 1995: Profile. Nicosia.

meetings the Greek Cypriot TV station Antenna IV broadcast a very negative report about the bi-communal meetings and accused the participants of making political concessions and conducting underhand negotiations. For several days the bi-communal contacts were dominating the news until the Greek Cypriot participants could refute the criticism by making public statements. This resulted in a lot of publicity for the new bi-communal activities. More and more individuals were aware of them and expressed an interest in participating.

The Oxford Workshop, the positive response of its participants and the successful dealing with the public attacks from within the Greek Cypriot society also meant a turning point for the American trainers because they managed to pave the way for continuous finance for the training on Cyprus. Both, the participants and the circle of foreign actors evaluated the workshop positively. Because of this, the Cyprus Fulbright Commission decided to continue their work by emphasising their commitment to bi-communal civic contacts and talks. As a reaction to the Oxford Workshop the Cyprus Fulbright Commission and Amideast requested major funding for additional training in conflict resolution on Cyprus. In response to that request IMTD, NTL and CMG formed the Cyprus Consortium. Until then, CMG had not been involved in projects on Cyprus but when Amideast offered funding they considered an engagement on the island. The initiative to co-operate came from Louise Diamond and was motivated to avoid competition in attempt to secure funding. Since IMTD and CMG draw on different approaches in terms of conflict resolution and conflict management their trainers had to meet for several days in order to synthesise a common approach for the “Cyprus Conflict Management Project”. As expected, the Consortium got the go ahead for the project which was sponsored by the Fulbright Commission and funded by the US Agency for International Development through Amideast.

In 1994, the Cyprus Consortium conducted eight training sessions for over 200 participants.<sup>14</sup> One workshop was for Cypriot students participating in the Cyprus American Scholarship Program (CASP). There were also three courses held for CASP

---

<sup>14</sup> To get a more detailed view of the goals of facilitators and participants see: Rothman, Jay: *Articulating Goals and Monitoring Progress in a Cyprus Conflict Resolution Training Workshop*, in: Marc Ross / Jay Rothman, 1999: *Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing Success and Failure*, London Macmillan Press, pp. 176 – 194.

alumni, two for project leaders involved in bi-communal activities and one included forty public leaders in a workshop in Coolfont, Virginia. Of particular importance in the development of the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group as an internal peace building actor was the Training of Trainers-Workshop which included individuals from the Oxford Workshop and those who expressed an interest after the hysterical public media campaign. When the Cyprus Consortium received a second grant from Amideast and the Cyprus Fulbright Commission for the period 1995-98, a workshop “Advanced Training for Trainers” was held. Since the number of bi-communal groups increased continuously, another “Training of Trainers” workshop was held in October 1997 with 25 more people who were to support the existing Conflict Resolution Trainer Group. Altogether six workshops were funded by the second grant including two for CASP-students in 1995 and 1997, a summer camp for Cypriot teenagers in the US, a workshop for political leaders and one for Greek and Turkish Cypriot educators.

Additionally, the Cyprus Consortium received a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to set up a study group for policy leaders dealing with the issue of “intractability”. From this group, which dissolved in 1998, the Harvard study group evolved. Both groups can be considered as a “track-one-and-half” initiative unrelated to the activities of the Trainer Group or the follow-up groups.

The activities of the Cyprus Consortium were important for the development of the Trainer Group as an internal actor as it had created a pool of qualified trainers in conflict resolution by their workshops “Training for Trainers”. Apart from this, the other courses and workshops favoured the development of the bi-communal civic groups as interested participants could join the local groups after their return to Cyprus. Although it was not a structured process, the training programme had kindled a general interest for conflict resolution and bi-communal activities.

One of the major disadvantages of the Cyprus Consortium was that none of its member organisation was represented on the island permanently. This led to an empowerment of local activists in the sense of skill building but for the development of a competent internal actor it needed a group building process which was not facilitated by the Consortium. This function was taken over by another actor, the Scholars of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission.

In order to understand the development of the Trainer Group and their method of dealing with existing obstacles it is necessary to understand the structure of the foreign support organisations.

With the emergence of the Cyprus Consortium an informal network of American actors was formed which supported the Trainer Group in their attempts to implement peace building projects. These were the Cyprus Consortium, the American Embassy in Nicosia, the American Center in Nicosia, the Cyprus Fulbright Commission and the Resident Scholar of the Fulbright Commission.

Although a hierarchy exists between the institutional state and non-state actors as well as between the Fulbright Commission and the scholars employed by them every single one of the network actors has a high degree of autonomy for his actions. In regard to the bi-communal involvement there is no such thing as formal obedience and a hierarchy of order. According to the interviewees, there was rather a feeling of “we Americans”. This is confirmed by the external observers who actually talk of the “American family” or “the Americans”<sup>15</sup> on Cyprus. In regard to the bi-communal activities the individual networks frequently exchange information. This is done in a formalised way (such as in meetings or by distributing lists of bi-communal activities that have happened) as well as in many informal encounters. The informal character of the network is illuminated when one considers that for example the Special Assistant for Bi-communal Affairs of the US Embassy is married to the Director of the American Center.

This tight network of personal relationships resulted in a more or less holistic view of the problems by the interviewed members of the US network involved in the realisation of bi-communal activities. The speakers proved well informed about their respective network colleagues independent of their organisation.

There are some obstacles for societal bi-communal groups to an extent that can not be overcome by the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group as an internal actor alone. Furthermore, they are of a nature and degree of complexity that they require multi-functional actions by the supporting actor. The study will show that the American network on Cyprus is capable of such a multiple function that requires a high degree of exchange and co-operation. The actors of the American network are

---

<sup>15</sup> See Interviews (7), (11), (30), (33), (34), (36), (37), (38), (39), (41), (42), (43), (44), (45).

capable of that, however, even a multi-functional actor like the American network on Cyprus has its limits.

The American network in the sense of an actor supporting bi-communal activities is the result of a developmental process. We can assume that even before the emergence of the Trainer Group and its follow-up groups there was a network of American organisations in Nicosia. The conscious intention to engage in bi-communal activities on a societal level only developed with the commitment of the Fulbright Commission and its co-operation with the Cyprus Consortium. Another indication of its increasing identification as an actor is the creation of positions dealing with bi-communal activities. Within the network, three types of positions have been created dealing full time with bi-communal activities and issues, namely the positions of Secretary in the Fulbright Commission, the position of the Fulbright Scholar that is also referred to as the “Field Practitioner” as well as the Special Assistant for Bi-communal Affairs at the US Embassy.

The relationship between the Fulbright Commission and the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group and its follow-up groups is very complex. As the resident Scholar has been the focus for the local activists of the Trainer Group for years, he is the personification of the relationship between the internal and external actors.

## **2.1 The Trainer Group as an Internal Actor**

Between 1994 and the summer of 1995 thirteen Greek and Turkish Cypriots from the aforementioned pool of trainers took part in a Design Workshop facilitated by Fulbright Resident Scholar Benjamin J. Broome with the aim of developing concepts for future peace building measures on Cyprus. In this workshop, the interactive management approach was applied, a problem solving approach which enabled groups to come to a consensus even on complex issues. The nine months long workshop was a process that can be separated into three phases: During the first phase, the participants achieved a shared understanding of the structures of obstacles for peace building projects on Cyprus. The second phase meant a development of a collective Statement of Visions in regard to the aims of the peace

building process. The third phase was marked by the development of projects, concepts and ideas to enhance the realisation of the Vision Statement.

Soon afterwards the group started referring to itself as the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group. During the next nine months it developed into a permanent working group of trainers that became the initiator for a series of peace building measures.

The Broome workshop had three aims:

- To serve as the framework for the Trainer Group and to enable the planning of concepts and projects for future peace building measures.
- The team spirit of the group was to be enhanced and encouraged in order to guarantee the implementation of the planned peace building measures.
- It served as a place for further learning and supplemented the initial training.

Within the framework of the Broome workshop the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group worked out two hundred and forty-one possible peace building projects out of which fifteen were finally accepted as projects to be implemented.<sup>16</sup> These projects were chosen according to the criteria of expected feasibility, which means, they seemed to be possible from the group perspective as well as under the given social conditions. Mid 1995 the group presented its fifteen projects publicly at a “bazaar” (*Agora bazar*) with the aim of recruiting more participants for them.

## **2.2 The First Phase of Proliferation**

The consolidation of the bi-communal Conflict Resolution Trainer Group was the beginning of the first phase of projects and proliferation that lasted until the violent inter-communal incidents in the summer of 1996.

---

<sup>16</sup> See Broome, Benjamin J., 1996: Designing the Future of Peace-Building Efforts in Cyprus - Report of Design Workshop held during Fall 1994 and Spring of 1995 with Conflict Resolution Trainers and Project Leaders. Available from the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, Nicosia. Broome, Benjamin J., 1997: Designing a Collective Approach to Peace: Interactive Design and Problem-Solving Workshop with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Communities in Cyprus, in: International Negotiation vol. 2, no. 3, 1997, pp. 381 - 407.

The planning of the mentioned fifteen peace building measures by the group rang in a new phase in the shaping of societal bi-communal relations. While until June 1995 the majority of bi-communal events were arranged by or with the help of foreign facilitators, from then on the Trainer Group became a separate, individual initiating force. The creation of new bi-communal follow-up groups by the Trainer Group was of particular importance for this development.

We can pinpoint three different origins of these newly founded groups that alone illuminate the distinctive job sharing between the Trainer Group and the foreign actors supporting it.

- Follow-up groups that were initiated by the Trainer Group with the participation of the Cyprus Consortium,
- Follow-up groups that were initiated by the Trainer Group exclusively,
- Follow-up groups that were initiated by the respective Scholar of the Fulbright Commission with the participation of the Trainer Group.

In spite of their training as conflict resolution trainers the participants were not at ease with the thought of holding bi-communal workshops on their own now and facilitating bi-communal groups. The first two workshops were held by a bi-communal team of trainers under the observation and supervision of the Cyprus Consortium. Those workshops were a success and the participants decided to meet regularly as a group in the buffer zone. These were the corner stones for the Educators Group and the Citizen Group - the first follow-up groups which were looked after and facilitated by the Trainer Group. Once the ice was broken, the confidence of the trainers in their abilities increased and further workshops and new groups followed without the participation of the Consortium.

The forming of new groups by the resident Fulbright Scholar followed a similar pattern because the groups constituted themselves as a follow-up to workshops. Those groups were referred to as “track-one-and-a-half” groups by the interviewees and other insiders.<sup>17</sup> They were supervised by the Fulbright Scholar, and a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot trainer were integrated as facilitators.

---

<sup>17</sup> These were: Young Political Leaders Group, Young Business Leaders Group, Women Group, University Students and later in 1997 the Environmental Group.

According to the analysis, the Trainer Group did not manage to integrate groups into the bi-communal process who were close to the political establishment on both sides - probably because of their social status and very likely because of their tendency to left-wing political orientation. This task was taken on by the Fulbright Commission which was perceived in an academic role and in regard to the Cypriot political orientation as a “neutral” actor. Apart from that, the Fulbright Commission enjoys a unique (legal) status in today’s Cyprus. Its foundation in 1962 happened *before* the inter-communal unrest of 1963 and *before* the dissolution of the bi-communal constitution. Its board consists of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and it maintains offices in both parts of the island. Grants have been given to students in both communities all along, and both communities were involved in the academic exchange with the US. This makes it the only bi-communal *organisation* on Cyprus to this day. The results of this are that the participation in one of the bi-communal groups initiated by the Fulbright Commission or facilitated by their Scholar is legally and symbolically safe for people in public life (and those who aspire to it). Decades of work have created a large number of personal relationships between the political establishment of the North and the South and the Cyprus Fulbright Commission. It is also of importance in regard to educational grants for their own children. As a result of this, the new groups founded by the Fulbright Commission are able to start on a higher societal level than the ones funded by the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group. To put it simply: An invitation by the Fulbright Commission which, in addition, has the official or unofficial support of the American embassy and the American Center cannot be ignored easily on Cyprus.

The distinction between groups founded by the Fulbright Commission and the ones created by the Trainer Group is not totally clear cut. The co-operative relationship between the two kinds of groups is recognisable by the shared facilitation. Apart from this, when groups are initiated by the Fulbright Scholar it is always discussed with the Trainer Group beforehand. This, among other things, has the result that the interviewees often don’t make any distinction between the new groups but rather consider them altogether as part of the growing “bi-communal process” or the “bi-communal movement”. It is also common that trainers refer to all existing groups as “ours”. International observers, however, tend to refer to them globally as “Fulbright groups” and neglect the activities of the local trainers.

The bi-communal follow-up groups usually meet every two to three weeks. Within the first phase of proliferation the follow-up bi-communal groups were formed by the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group: the Educator's Group, the Citizens Group, the Federation and EU Study Group, Peace Concert, and the Cultural Evening Planning group, the "Letters to the Other Side" group and the "Technology for Peace" project group, the Management Group, the Women Group, Young Political Leaders, Young Business Leaders, Students I and the Lawyers group. Usually approximately 200 Cypriots were members in these bi-communal groups.

### **2.3 The Temporary Disruption of Activities**

The violent events in the buffer zone in August 1996 put an end to all bi-communal activities. Greek Cypriot bikers broke through the barricades of the police and the UN-peace keeping soldiers, the "Blue Helmets" and invaded the buffer zone near Derinya to get into the northern part of the island. During this event a Greek Cypriot was beaten to death by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot "counter demonstrators". A few days later another Island Greek was shot by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot soldiers while attempting to rip the Turkish Cypriot flag from the mast. These incidents caused an outcry in the Greek Cypriot community. Demonstrations on the Greek Cypriot side prevented all meetings of the bi-communal groups.

Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot government closed off all crossings to the southern part of the island. One of the trainers remembers:

"I remember when I watched the events and was pulling my hair and said: All the work we have done in the last five years went down the drain. By reason of one effect [event]." (30:11)

Even in this situation the members of the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group could agree they wanted to give signals of reconciliation. Direct communication between the members was impossible and during the whole phase could only happen via the Fulbright Scholar Benjamin Broome. However, the international community and the United Nations on Cyprus could be convinced that in both communities there was a pool of people who were prepared to make a reconciliatory statement opposing

violence and the hateful propaganda of both sides. This led to a bi-communal reception by the United Nations in the Ledra Palace on September 30<sup>th</sup> 1996 attended by nearly four hundred people from both sides of the island. The guests consisted of activists and participants of the groups described as well as of the experts and professional groups of the Nicosia Master Plan. This meeting, in a generally friendly and relaxed atmosphere, was considered visible evidence by the participants for the possibility of a peaceful rapprochement and equally impressed the diplomats and representatives of the United Nations present.

While the demonstration by the bikers and their violent invasion of the buffer zone and the brutal murders were perceived as a sign of an escalation of the Cyprus Conflict by the rest of the world, the peaceful bi-communal meeting of Greek and Turkish Cypriots went largely unnoticed by the world press. The same evening the representative of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force on Cyprus decided to celebrate the anniversary of the United Nations, October 24<sup>th</sup> 1996, with a big bi-communal event. There was little time to prepare the reception for one thousand five hundred guests – people involved in bi-communal activities as well as supporters. All in all three thousand Cypriots registered their interest in being invited which demonstrated a willingness for meetings and communication that had been considered impossible only a few weeks before. Apart from this successful event there were hardly any bi-communal meetings or activities on the civic level, as the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus did not grant any permits to the buffer zone to Turkish Cypriot activists.

#### **2.4 The Second Phase of Proliferation**

The second phase of projects and proliferation commenced in March 1997 when the Turkish authorities lifted the blockade against bi-communal meetings and again allowed entry to the buffer zone. The end of the Turkish Cypriot blockade was the result of an increased political involvement by the American government in the Cyprus Conflict which put more pressure on both Cypriot governments. Even more diplomatic activities were triggered by the announcement by President Clerides in

January 1997 that Russian S-300 rockets were to be stationed on the island. When new inter-communal talks were announced on a political level, the Turkish Cypriot government lifted the blockade.

The possibility of further meetings initiated a whole series of projects and the formation of numerous new groups. During the second phase of proliferation the following groups were founded: the Citizens Group II-VII, the Brussels Women Group, the Students Group II, the Co-Villager Project, Youth Encounters for Peace, Young Environmentalists, the Hade Magazine, the Artists Group, the Federalism Group and the Environmental Group. In addition, new forms of cross-visits were conducted.<sup>18</sup>

### **3 The Dialogue in the Bi-Communal Groups**

The Trainer Group developed a network of twenty-five (informal) bi-communal citizens groups. One of their aims was the training of conflict resolution techniques and the initiation of a “deep dialogue” between the members. Deep Dialogue was characterized by the steps “listening – understanding – acknowledging”.

For many Cypriots the first encounter and the following exchange between people of a different community is an important intellectual and emotional event. For the first time within the parameters of a facilitated dialogue there is the opportunity to listen to the point of view of the other community in regard to historic events of the conflict as well as to contemporary issues. At the same time, the dialogue offers the chance to communicate one’s own opinions and attitudes to the other group.

---

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix: Overview of the Group Development

In this case study we cannot deal with the processes of the individual bi-communal groups in detail.<sup>19</sup> On the whole we can say that the Trainer Group did not have a unified, overall method of training or facilitation. It was rather that the individual members developed their own style based on the training by the Cyprus Consortium and further input by some Fulbright Scholars. In spite of that there are some basic rules which were applied in all follow-up groups. These are: individuality of the participants, who are only allowed to speak for themselves, informality of encounters which means that none of the participants is present in his or her official-professional function, confidentiality, consensual voting and mutual respect.

The author came to the conclusion that the bi-communal teams of trainers managed to a great extent to initiate a deep dialogue between the participants. We would like to mention as one indicator the enhanced scope for action by the groups based on this dialogue, as well as the sustainability of the civic groups even in times of violence like the summer of 1996. The quality of the dialogue is clearly connected to the willingness to co-operate. Only after the steps listening, understanding and acknowledging have been tackled, the group is able to implement certain projects, as will be shown below.

On the contrary, it is very difficult to initiate a deep-dialogue on the level of a track-one-and-a-half group. Participants do not accept basic rules of the conflict resolution approach like speaking in their private capacity. The view expressed by one participant is more the rule than the exception.

“I am there as an individual but they take my statements as a political leader. So it is useless to say I am there as an individual.” (46:12)

There is a clear and open mistrust against the presence of an American facilitator because it is feared that the expressed views could become part of the official negotiation process via the US network. The local co-trainers did not do better than the facilitating Fulbright scholar because they were perceived as a part of the network. This does not mean that there is no learning-process on behalf of the participants. The above speaker considered the process as helpful. However, it is

---

<sup>19</sup> See Broome, Benjamin J., 1998: Overview of Conflict Resolution Activities in Cyprus: Their Contribution To The Peace Process, in: *The Cyprus Review* vol. 10, no. 1., Spring 1998, pp. 47 - 66. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, Maria, 1993: Unofficial Intercommunal Contacts and their Contribution to Peacebuilding in Conflict Societies: The Case of Cyprus, in: *The Cyprus Review* vol. 5, no. 2, 1993, pp. 68 - 87.

very doubtful that any kind of acknowledging or deep dialogue is taking place. Consequently no common projects are being developed or implemented by this group.

## **4 The Structure of the Bi-Communal Groups**

Before we examine the obstacles the Trainer Group encountered in setting up the bi-communal process it is important to have a look at the structure of the bi-communal groups. The pattern of the groups and the rules by which they function are closely connected to the structure of the Cyprus Conflict. In other words, to a large degree the groups are reflecting the “unwritten rules” of the Cyprus Conflict. These criteria are: Bi-communality, equal representation of communities, informality, the inclusion of leftwing and rightwing political orientations, English as the working language and the equal participation of men and women. For the overwhelming number of interviewees these criteria are personally relevant (internal dimension) but there is also some kind of direct or indirect social control which makes ignoring these criteria very difficult or even impossible (external dimension) The acceptance of these criteria enables peace-building activities but they are also a hindrance as they limit the scope of possible actions.

Let me explain the internal and external dimensions by the example of equal representation of communities. The criteria of “equal numbers” means the factual equality and equal treatment of the participants from both communities. On an inter-group level it means that the group based on equal representation above all gives the Turkish Cypriots a space in which to feel safe and where it is not the dominated or defeated minority. This feeling of safety is of personal importance for many Turkish Cypriots and it is doubtful whether they would participate in a process in

which this would not be guaranteed. At the same time there is also a level of external control.

“All this workshop the participants have equal number. So, Denktash and our government can’t criticise us. ‘You are going and you accept minority rights’, etc.” (1:52)

For the Turkish Cypriot authorities an unbalanced representation would be a violation of their demand for political equality and for the acceptance as an equal community and not as a minority. Even a symbolic violation of this criteria would most certainly lead to political reactions and endanger any further participation of the Turkish Cypriots. At the same time the criterium of equal numbers is an obstacle for the bi-communal groups as they are forced to grow accordingly and are consequently always depending on the smaller partner. For example, in the North more women are organised than in the South, and sometimes they felt noticeably hindered by the principle of equal numbers. Apart from that, in regard to the marked difference in population in both communities, for the people of the north a noticeably higher degree of mobilisation was necessary.

Each of the criteria mentioned above implies its specific limitations. On the Turkish side, bi-communality symbolizes renewed equality of both communities. At the same time it emphasises the emancipation and the enhancement of their status as the Turkish Cypriot community as a separate group from the rest of the Turkish population in the North and the influence of “Big Brother” Turkey. The exclusion of people originating from mainland Turkey has a highly symbolic meaning for island Greeks. The inclusion of mainland Turks would result in a massive refusal by the Greek Cypriot society as the question of Turkish settlements in the North is politically highly controversial and explosive. On the other hand, the actual involvement of immigrant mainland Turks in “bi-communal” activities would be interpreted as an indirect acceptance by the Turkish Cypriot government of their policy of settlement.

For that reason it constitutes a strong obstacle for the Trainer Group and their follow-up groups because a process of social reconciliation with the Turks in the North who either immigrated or are settled there does not seem possible. Considering that approximately 50% of the people living in the North are of Turkish origin this is not a negligible restriction.

There are some characteristics unconnected to the structure of the Cyprus Conflict and the positions of the leading negotiators. This concerns English as the group language. In the same vein, the parity between men and woman mirrors the internal values of the founders of the groups. Still, they can impair the scope of the internal peace building actors. English as the language of communication has an impact on the composition and the social scope of the bi-communal groups as only members of the educated middle class can be integrated.

Another point of interest is the criteria of left-wing and right-wing participation. This applies to the integration of people of left-wing and right-wing political parties as members of bi-communal groups. According to the analysis the left-right participation is not so much a criteria of the grassroots groups on Track-Two level but rather for the groups of track one-and-a-half facilitated by the Fulbright Scholar. Furthermore, it is also of greater importance for the composition of the Turkish-Cypriot participants.

There are indicators that the realisation of a left-right equality is easier for the foreign actors than for local ones. The formal party-political neutrality of the foreign actor enhances his scope of action. The reunification of this internal political conflict group seems to be difficult for internal actors as they are either aligned to a political party or perceived as such.

The indicators for group building are influenced by the positions of the conflicting parties on the peacemaking level. There seem to be two motives for the forming and keeping of characteristics. There is a level of personal internalization as well as a level of external control.

## **5 Obstacles for the Bi-Communal Process**

There are two major factors obstructing the bicomunal process: self-restriction and repression. The term self-restriction on the one hand means the omission of an act of behaviour in a conscious and self-determined way. On the other hand, self-restriction can also be a reaction to some anticipated criticism or risk. In the case of the former an omission of an action such as “crossing the border” has the characteristic of a voluntary boycott, while the second form of omission would happen for fear of possible negative reactions. This fear on the side of the person exerting self-restriction corresponds to a successful deterrent on the side of those who want to prevent a crossing. Both motives are present on Cyprus. Often the non-action by an individual is influenced by both kinds so it is impossible to clearly determine the contributing factors or to assess them.

All attempts by governmental and non-governmental organisations that try to prevent legal acts such as entering the buffer zone often by violent measures, intimidations, threats and hindrance are considered a repression.

### **5.1 Obstacles in the Context of Encounters**


Contacts and encounters between members of the conflicting parties are the basic conditions of every peace building approach. In this study we define bi-communal encounters as the physical meeting of people from both island communities. We will not be evaluating the contents of these encounters but rather aim to analyse those factors that hinder the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group in organising bi-communal encounters by, for example, making the crossing difficult or completely preventing it. For that we contrast the most frequent patterns of explanation in both communities in regard to bi-communal meetings. The questions are: How open are the checkpoints on Cyprus? What are the reasons for their impenetrability? A realistic

explanation of the reasons for impenetrability is the basis for an analysis of the encounter-based peacebuilding activities of internal and foreign actors.

We have to differentiate between two forms of encounters on Cyprus. A *crossing* means that individuals move from the North to the South and vice versa. The person leaves the legal territory of his or her community or state and enters the legal territory of the other community. When they meet in the middle it means that both parties leave their legal territory and meet in a place that belongs to neither territory. This could be the buffer zone under control of the United Nations or an encounter abroad.

While the crossing is an act of self-determination of the respective persons and parties, the meeting in the middle is a form of encounter that at least on Cyprus requires the involvement of a foreign actor. If a crossing is not possible or does not appear to be possible, the only alternative is a meeting in the middle.

A checkpoint exists in a continuum of openness and limitations. It is an offer to cross as well as a place of possible selection of the people crossing expressed in the refusal of the passing permit to certain groups or individuals. To illustrate the process of encounters it is necessary to deal with the geographical conditions of the crossing points and the places of encounter taking as an example the Checkpoint Ledra Palace in Nicosia.

**Table 1: Ledra Palace Checkpoint**

Persons crossing from the South to the North from the Greek Cypriot side have to pass a checkpoint of the Greek Cypriot police. Only a few meters later they enter the buffer zone. After approximately 50 meters and behind destroyed and empty houses is the new building of the Fulbright Commission (New Fulbright) and the Ledra Palace Hotel, the residence of the United Nations. A short distance behind the Ledra Palace Hotel a UN-guard is positioned as an observer. When leaving the buffer zone one enters the Northern parts of Nicosia and passes a Turkish Cypriot checkpoint. On leaving this checkpoint the crossing ends. The distance covered is approximately 250 meters.

In the case of meeting in the middle one does not pass the UN guard but turns off to the left to the building of the Fulbright Commission or to the Ledra Palace Hotel.

When crossing over, the members of the Trainer Group encounter two obstacles based on two factors, self-restriction and repression. These factors don't bear the same relevance for the sub-groups of the Trainer Group.

The overriding rule of avoiding an "implicit recognition" of the North makes a crossing for a Greek Cypriot into the Turkish Cypriot North very problematic. Avoiding any implicit recognition means that nothing should be done that could be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the other's legality as a state. On their way from the South to the North particularly Greek Cypriots seemingly have to act in a way that recognizes the Turkish Cypriot state that in their mind does not exist. For that reason Greek Cypriots refuse to cross (self-restriction).<sup>20</sup>

In contrast to this there is no recognizable self-restriction among the Turkish Cypriot members of the Trainer Group because they do not question the existence of a Greek-Cypriot state in principle but there are very serious obstacles put up by their government and authorities that have an impact on them. None of the sub-groups of the Trainer Group is – though for different reasons - able to cross over individually to take part in a bi-communal encounter. The Greek Cypriot members refuse to cross under the existing conditions, and the Turkish Cypriot members are prevented from doing it. Without the support of foreign actors, bi-communal meetings of the Trainer Group are impossible.

This clarification of the actual reasons for the lack of crossings enables us to focus on realistic measures of support for internal actors as well as the Trainer Group. In regard to the scope of action for foreign actors working on the possibility that people from both sides can meet, it means that they have to deal with the problems of self-restriction and the external restrictions of their freedom of movement. Both problems require very different measures of support and intervention on the part of the foreign actors which will be analysed in the following.

---

<sup>20</sup> Regarding the concept of "implicit recognition" see Oliver Wolleh, *Cyprus: A Civil Society Caught up in the Question of Recognition*, in: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (ed.), *Searching for Peace in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia*, to be published in June 2001.; Wolleh, Oliver, 1998: *Gesellschaftliche Vertrauensbildung: Über die schwierige Anerkennung in Zypern*, in: *Gewaltfreie Aktion*, Heft 115/116, 30. Jahrg., 1. + 2. Quartal 1998.

## **5.2 Counterbalancing Interventions in the Context of Encounters**

The complexity of the obstacles of self-restriction and repression means that they are not easily overcome by the members of the Trainer Group. This leads to a multi-layered co-operation between the foreign parties. In regard to bi-communal encounters these activities of the foreign actors are Good Offices, Bypass Activities and Political Pressure. Good Offices describe the provision of an infrastructure suitable for an encounter. A Bypass Activity we call all actions that are aimed at enabling the internal actor (the Trainer Group and the bi-communal follow-up groups) to avoid an obstacle. Bypassing is a kind of problem avoidance. Other than with successful political influence the obstacle remains. It does not get removed or transformed, only bypassed. Political pressure is the attempt by a party to remove external obstacles and restrictions of direct encounters by influencing the persons responsible.

### **5.2.1 Meeting in the Middle**

Meeting in the middle describes the encounter in a place which is not under the control and the laws of one of the two conflicting parties. On Cyprus, for the majority of cases, this means a meeting in the buffer zone controlled by the United Nations. The existence of a place like the buffer zone has various advantages for crossings. As described previously, the crossing is an encounter which for the island Greeks implies clear self-restriction and is therefore a disadvantage. By meeting in the buffer zone the Greeks can avoid the checkpoint procedures of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This results in the overwhelming majority of bi-communal encounters on Cyprus happening in the buffer zone.

In regard to the Good Offices, the necessary space is provided at the UN base Ledra Palace. This is the most common contribution of the United Nations to all kinds of bi-communal encounters. As the three rooms in the Ledra Palace available for bi-communal activities are not sufficient because of the growing numbers of the groups, the Cyprus Fulbright Commission erected a new building in 1997 (New Fulbright) next to the Ledra Palace in which four further rooms are available. Apart

from this, the New Fulbright has telephone connections to the North and South, copiers and fax machines. This means that the Trainer Group, for the first time, had some technical equipment at its disposal. This was not available in the rooms at the Ledra Palace, as they were used for other events as well, e.g. press conferences, and a permanent use by the Trainer Group was not possible. The new Fulbright building provides them with an infrastructure that to a degree is appropriate to the growing number of bi-communal groups.

So far neither the Greek Cypriots nor the Turkish Cypriots have been prepared to maintain a place of encounter in the buffer zone or to participate financially in the costs of the new infrastructure.<sup>21</sup> The Greek Cypriot government refuses to establish a meeting place because they fear that this could amount to a legalisation of the buffer zone. Meeting in the middle is considered a symbolic abandonment of the demand for freedom of movement on the whole island. The status quo would lose some of its provisional character. The meeting of large parts of the population in the buffer zone would meet the need of many island Greeks for visits and encounters and diminish the urgency for an overall solution.<sup>22</sup> The Turkish Cypriot government does not seem to display any, or only a limited, detectable interest in encounters that don't implicitly demand an acceptance of their political existence.<sup>23</sup>

Apart from the Ledra Palace Hotel there are a few other places for bi-communal encounters, such as the offices of the UNHCR in the buffer zone or the village of Pyla, also in the buffer zone, which is inhabited by island Greeks and Turks. Pyla in the East is only of limited importance for the bi-communal societal groups as it is relatively remote and there are no suitable rooms for meetings. So the United Nations and the Fulbright Commission and their Good Offices supply the basic conditions for continuous social bi-communal encounters on Cyprus.

Surprisingly, the importance of the buffer zone as a place of safety is not mentioned any more in the interviews of 1997. This can be explained by the fact that for the members of the bi-communal groups, especially the Trainer Group, its function as a safety zone had vanished into the background and one had got used to the presence of the United Nations.

---

<sup>21</sup> See Interview (35).

<sup>22</sup> See Interview (33:20).

<sup>23</sup> See Interview (33:21).

It can be argued that without the existence of a neutral space such as the buffer zone, direct encounters between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the civic level would be impossible, as the only other alternative would be crossings. In this sense the meeting in the middle gives the internal actors more scope for activities. At the same time this form of encounter is restrictive as it appears artificial and the place offers only limited possibilities for actions. Some of the hindrances – such as very few rooms for meetings - could be removed by the foreign parties. But meeting in the middle also means some restrictions that could not be compensated. One of the Greek Cypriot trainers criticises:

“I think that Ledra Palace is an artificial place. That just empowers the division. And the division is not only on the land, the division is first in your minds and hearts. So, I believe that when people move back and forth they create a new energy, a new momentum of people’s movement on the island. And second, they see how the others are. What are the conditions? What is the environment? What are the attitudes? And I think it contributes to our knowledge more than just being restricted to that damned place. Also, it is the opportunity to behave more naturally. (...) And I think that’s how people should be how they deserve to be and not be dealt with as experimental elements of whatever.” (32:2)

The detachedness of the bi-communal places of encounter (Ledra Palace, New Fulbright) can be experienced by every visitor who enters the building from between the destroyed houses and overgrown gardens. The place lends itself to communication and dialogue, but shared actions are impossible as it is so far removed from all social life. This applies even more to the rooms at the Ledra Palace than to ones in the New Fulbright. The new building of the Fulbright Commission is well equipped (telephone, fax, pc, TV) which enables the Trainer Group a better organisation and communication with their environment. The rooms at the Ledra Palace don’t offer those opportunities.

### **5.2.2 “Easy Access” Interventions**

The term “easy access” was locally coined and is used by the Greek Cypriot members of the bi-communal movement. Generally it describes an easy crossing of Greek Cypriots to the North of the Island without having to perform certain acts and symbolic gestures which in their mind would signal the implicit recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. With the help of foreign actors the crossing becomes an easy access.

The dilemmas and contradictions in regard to the question of in what way a crossing would be a form of implicit recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus can be remarkable, even with long term members of the Trainer Group. The following quotation is by a Greek Cypriot trainer:

“Personally I don’t give a damn whether they sign them [immigration forms] or not. I would not sign because I will be accused of things I am not responsible for. If I sign a form and the form says on top TRNC, by filling it people say you are recognising the state. Maybe they are correct. I would not fill in any form. For me, the Republic of Cyprus starts in Paphos (a place in the South) and goes to Kyrenia (place in the North) (...) People who sign I think they are not doing the right thing, not because they recognise the North but because they justify the North to demand something for you to sign something. This is part of controlling you indirectly. Maybe they can later use it against you.” (44:35)

Other Greek Cypriot trainers share this uncertainty. Every detail of the procedures at the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint seems to be relevant. The question of whether one’s own identity card has to be shown or one has to fill out a form that has to be signed personally determines whether a Greek Cypriot conflict resolution trainer is willing to pass a checkpoint or not.

“But gradually I realised that this can not lead to any kind of official recognition of the regime there by me showing my ID (...) So, filling the form, OK (...) I would not like to put my signature on that. They don’t ask actually for a signature.” (32:10)

In the context of bi-communal encounters this means that the forms for entering the North in the beginning were not filled in by the Greek Cypriots but by colleagues or a

foreign actor, be it the Fulbright Commission or, less frequently, the United Nations. The Greek Cypriot trainers only have to pass on their personal details to the Fulbright Commission.<sup>24</sup>

This means that the Greek Cypriots are bypassing their specific problem of implicit recognition. The symbolic meaning of the crossing is neutralised by a foreign party. At the same time, it means that a crossing without this “easy access mechanism” is still not acceptable for Greek Cypriot members.

With the increasing trust between the members of the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group the Turkish Cypriot members, for example, have taken over the tasks originally performed by the foreign parties. The forms of the Greek Cypriot members are now filled out by island Turks. This means former functions of the United Nations and the Fulbright Commission have been taken on by the group itself. The degree of independent actions has increased.

The Turkish Cypriot administration responds to the decreasing self-restriction by the island Greeks and attempts to provoke another boycott by the Greek Cypriots by tightening the formalities for entering. When the self-restricting effect of the Turkish checkpoint procedures lessened, the Turkish Cypriot authorities defied previous assurances and again demanded the personal signature on the passing requests of visiting island Greeks. They deliberately made the crossing more difficult and blocked the easy access mechanism. The immediate response of the island Greeks was refusal.

“But once, we had to visit Famagusta [ a place in the North] we were stopped at the checkpoint there. They said: ‘You fill in forms.’ We said: ‘No we don’t fill in the form.’ We were there for two hours. It happened that the American ambassador was passing in his car, coming from the North to the South. He saw us, he waved at us, he stopped to talk to us. ‘What are you doing here?’ We said: ‘We are here for 1 ∞ hours.’ ‘What?’ because he knew that we are going to the North. ‘Why?’ We said what they want. So he gets of his car, he got his telephone, he made several phones. I don’t know what happened and then, they let us go.”

(44:13)

---

<sup>24</sup> See Interview (44:23).

Even though this was a spontaneous intervention by the American ambassador, the episode illustrates a noticeable and documented American influence on the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint procedures.<sup>25</sup>

On the surface “easy access” appears to be merely a formal administrative service but it is also the result of political influence by foreign actors on Turkish Cypriot checkpoint procedures. The result was that at the Turkish Cypriot checkpoints all that was required were some personal details rather than the individual wanting to cross having to fill out and sign a form personally.

The Turkish Cypriot checkpoint procedures are deliberately aimed to provoke the Greek Cypriots to impose self-restriction. This proves that the Greek Cypriot members of the Trainer Group cannot widen their scope for action by adapting their behaviour. According to previous experience, even if individual Greek Cypriot trainers would begin to sign the immigration forms it can be expected that the Turkish Cypriot administration would attempt to trigger self-restriction among the people wanting to cross by an increased tightening of the rules. If this should not have the desired effect, they can always resort to exclusion.

### **5.2.3 Checkpoint Interventions**

It is a considerable problem for the activists that, time and again, the Turkish Cypriot authorities at very short notice refuse passing permits to the Turkish Cypriot members of the Trainer Group.<sup>26</sup> There is always grave disappointment when after a long journey one is not allowed to pass and the Greek Cypriot members of the group are waiting in vain in the buffer zone for the island Turks. Events like this undermine the motivation of the participants on both sides. Apart from a total ban, sometimes only some individual are allowed into the buffer zone and the group remains incomplete. Such events are often explained with “administrative difficulties with

---

<sup>25</sup> The transcript further indicates the closeness between the bi-communal activists and the US Embassy because the Ambassador recognises them.

<sup>26</sup> See Interview (19:76).

the application forms”. Conditions like this prevent a systematic function of the bi-communal groups and frustrate their members.<sup>27</sup>

“We saw the former Foreign Minister, he told us: ‘Why do you always apply through the Americans?’ But I told him: ‘We applied many times on our own we did not get permissions.’ We tried everything that was possible. And we don’t get permissions unless there is a strong third party that will push for us permissions.” (7:104)

It needs to be mentioned that this very minister whose department refused numerous pass requests maintains that the applications for passing permits would be a mere formality.

### **5.3 Obstacles in the Context of Institutionalisation**

Bi-communal institutionalisation describes the formation of an organisation that is determined by bi-communal membership and leadership. Bi-communal institutionalisation is found in two variations, namely, as an extension of an existing mono-communal Cypriot institution to a bi-communal one by including people of the other community, or as a bi-communal new formation of a governmental and/or private Greek-Turkish Cypriot institution. It can occur in either one of the two Cypriot states or abroad.

Without encounters and when people don’t know each other, neither the desire for nor the vision of a form of bi-communal institutionalisation can arise. The discussion of a bi-communal institutions already constitutes a result of previous bi-communal processes during which people of both communities had the opportunity to meet and to develop a common aim.<sup>28</sup>

The wish for bi-communal institutionalisation can be understood as an indicator of an existing or growing relationship between individuals within the bi-communal process. In the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group the wish for bi-communal institutionalisation developed at the end of the continuous training

---

<sup>27</sup> See Interview (2:29).

phase. Of fifteen planned projects, four were to be bi-communal institutions. These were a bi-communal Women's Centre, a bi-communal Centre for Historical, Social and Cultural Issues of both island communities, a Language Centre for Greeks and Turks as well as a Training Centre for Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving.

The advantages of a bi-communal NGO or institution compared with an informal group are manifold. For one thing, any form of institutionalisation serves as a further cementation of bi-communalism because it is tied to a financial plan. An established access to resources like rooms and staff results in continuity and safer planning as well as in a more professional approach by the members. Apart from this, a formal institution is a legal body that can officially receive donations and other forms of private or institutional support. It is therefore not surprising that the Trainer Group is planning to form new and bi-communal organisations. However, during the time of the analysis there was no case of bi-communal institutionalisation.

As in the context of encounters, self-restriction and oppression are two important factors that result in non-action by local activists. The Greek-Cypriot members of the Trainer Group, for example, reject the opportunity to join a Turkish-Cypriot organisation because they formally operate within the legal system of a state they do not acknowledge and that they do not want to recognize implicitly either. In principle, the same applies for the Turkish Cypriots. At the same time all members know that such a step would provoke a political reaction, even if some of them should be prepared to take it. For that reason, the Trainer Group has initiated a series of trials that I would like to call Pseudo-Institutionalisation. In other words, formally there won't be any bi-communal institutions but the need for them is to be satisfied materially. Two functions of an institutionalisation are of particular importance, the creation of a bi-communal legal body and of a financial structure. Five such strategies will be described and discussed. So far, all attempts at a Pseudo-Institutionalisation have failed.

---

28 See Interview (37:41).

### *Continuous financing of projects by the EU*

For years now the EU has had a budget for bi-communal projects, but those funds have to be managed by the official Planning Bureau in the South. The management of EU-funds is an expression of the claim of sole representation by the Greek Cypriots. On the Turkish side, the acceptance of these funds would be interpreted as an acknowledgement of this claim and therefore does not happen. As a result, five million ECU that were granted have not been claimed so far.

The Greek Cypriot government, well aware of the Turkish boycott, has not even attempted to create a financial organisation that would enable the Turkish Cypriot institutions and social groups to participate in the international funds equally meant for them. This view is shared by some Greek Cypriot trainers. In spite of this, the criticism of their own government is only mild.

### *Parallel Institutionalisation and Informal Financing by the EU*

Another way of avoiding the problem of institutionalisation is the strategy of parallel institutionalisation. This means that on each side a mono-communal NGO is formed which on an informal basis sees itself as a bi-communal unit. In that sense parallel institutionalisation is an attempt to avoid the problems described above of the impossibility of bi-communal membership and the refusal of granted international funds by the island Turks. A solution would be found if the Greek Cypriot NGO applied for international funds and received them and then informally transferred the money to the Turkish Cypriot partner.<sup>29</sup>

So far, this model of financing could not be implemented for various reasons, mainly the legal and administrative requests of the donating organisations. The concept of an informal co-operation of two parallel organisations only meets with scepticism or refusal among the donating organisations because the money would be transferred to a Turkish Cypriot (partner) organisation with whom they have no contractual agreements at all. Apart from this, funds granted, as by the EU, for bi-communal projects, would de facto be paid to a mono-communal (Greek Cypriot)

---

<sup>29</sup> See Interview (16:30).

organisation. Under those circumstances, a legally and administratively correct procedure is impossible.

Such a process would also mean the clear bypassing of the authority of the Republic of Cyprus and the donors would be made publicly accountable within the Greek Cypriot community. Apart from this, it can be assumed that the authorities in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would insist on a correct transfer of the money to its citizens. In fact, the the Turkish Cypriot Government let the Trainers know that a mono-communal institutionalisation is not appreciated.

With this model, the potential recipients within the Turkish Cypriot society in the North could be defamed as bribed lackeys of the EU or the Greek Cypriot government. Furthermore, there are group-internal reasons why the model of parallel institutionalisation turned out a non-viable strategy for the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group. According to one of the Fulbright Scholars the informal relationship and its uncertainties (e.g. of the finance and the realisation of the project on both sides) between the two mono-communal organisations proves too much for the existing basis of trust between the members of the Trainer Group.

### *Institutionalisation in the Buffer Zone*

The idea of an institutionalisation in the buffer zone is based on the assumption that leaving the legal system of both Cypriot states behind would mean an institutionalisation on “neutral ground”. Practically all of the institutions planned by the Trainer Group were to happen in the buffer zone.

In reality, the buffer zone does not offer a sufficiently developed structure for the establishment of institutions and its legal situation is not clear enough to allow new formations taking place. According to the Greek Cypriot government, the buffer zone is part of the Republic of Cyprus. The government insists on a positive confirmation of this legal status. Every deviation from this condition represents a violation of the Greek Cypriot self image as a state and is rejected.

### *Institutionalisation on “Islands of Federalism”*

Since the middle of 1997 the concept of “islands of federalism” has been discussed by the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group and was advocated as a concept for a project.<sup>37</sup> The idea is one example of the activities of the “think tank” and the lobbying activities of the Trainer Group. It is based on the fundamental concept of an institutionalisation in the buffer zone and attempts to create a legal base for bi-communal institutions that avoids the question of recognition by establishing federal zones in the buffer zone. These federal zones are established according to a new legal form of the state. As both governments since the negotiations of 1979 have agreed on a bi-communal concept of a Federal Republic of Cyprus, these islands would be a first step towards the new state in the making. The implementation of such a concept is beyond the competencies of actions and negotiations of a civic group such as the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group. For that reason the strategy for implementation means a careful lobbying for a concept that can only be realised within the parameters of a whole package of trust-building measurements.

### *Institutionalisation Abroad*

One possibility would be the establishment of a bi-communal organisation somewhere in Europe as the question of recognition would not be an issue. This possibility has been discussed by the Trainer Group but so far there has been no such a formation. The disadvantages are the high costs in terms of money and time which would exceed the resources of the group members.

So far, none of the foreign actors working on Cyprus have provided the Trainer Group or other bi-communal activities with an institutionalised establishment for various reasons. For one thing, supranational and international organisations are severely limited in their actions by the question of recognition. On the other hand, it is not in either governments’ interest to accept a financial arrangement for bi-communal societal groups which is “neutral” and does not address the question of recognition. They rather aim at forms of interaction that would confirm their respective state explicitly or implicitly. It can be assumed that this is the reason why no state actor, neither the USA nor Great Britain, directly supports the Trainer Group

and other bi-communal groups to realise some form of institutionalisation that does not recognise the South or the North.

The financial support of the Trainer Group and its follow-up groups by an international NGO might be a possibility. Other than with the EU, the funds would not have to be distributed by the Planning Bureau and that would make them acceptable to the Island Turks, also. This model has been implemented in the summer 2000 for the Peace-Linc project. In this project, members of the Trainers Group train peace activists from Israel and Palestine. In addition, a four-party exchange of experiences is planned. In co-operation with a Dutch NGO the project money is acquired from the EU paying trainers in the North and South.

This, however, has not happened so far as it can be anticipated that the two Cypriot governments would not accept such a bypass without any resistance. None of the foreign actors involved in bi-communal activities seems willing to face such a confrontation and to face the political costs of an effective bypass of the question of recognition.

The reason for the lack of international financial support for bi-communal groups between 1994-2000 is not only the low political will of possible foreign supporters. It is very doubtful whether foreign *state support* of an internal bi-communal actor would not lead to his or her moral undermining in the public's eye. An international NGO would clearly have greater scope for activities. For reasons of credibility, it would have to be more than just an agent for the transfer of international funds to local bi-communal groups.

There is a lot to indicate that an avoidance of the question of recognition would only be possible if both Cypriot governments could be pushed to accept such a bypass. Such a bypass construct, whether it is suggested by foreign or internal actors, would come under political pressure if the governments are not prepared to accept them silently and do without a direct symbolic confirmation of their state.

## **6 The Development Since 1997**

After the EU summit in Luxembourg the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as often before, blocked the issue of permits at the Ledra Palace Checkpoint. Only in the following months did it become sufficiently clear that the Turkish Cypriot government was determined to cut off all bi-communal contacts in the long run. The established mechanisms of the US networks failed to guarantee the freedom of movement of Turkish Cypriots. The question of how determined the attempts of the US network were to convince the Turkish Cypriot authorities to re-open the Ledra Palace checkpoint cannot be answered.

At the end of 1997, shortly before the total ban of all bi-communal activities, there were about twenty-five bi-communal groups. At the end of 1997 the bi-communal movement undermined the positions of the Turkish Cypriot government in their extent, form and contents more than would have been the case for the Greek Cypriot government. For this reason, on the Turkish Cypriot side the bi-communal process was considered biased and in its continuous growth presented an increasing political threat.

From the beginning, the bi-communal activities of the Trainer Group represented a potential risk and an advantage for the Greek as well as the Turkish Cypriot government, in other words, the grass-root activities on the track-two-level could be a complement as well as a hindrance to the track-one-level.

The Greek Cypriot government generally perceived the danger that the existing structure of isolation and embargoes of the South towards the North could be undermined by the citizens. That created the risk that the bi-communal civic contacts could mean an implicit recognition of the state in the North. Apart from this, other issues of negotiation such as the aforementioned resettlement of all immigrant mainland Turks could have been transcended by the civic groups. In the course of events those concerns proved unfounded as the Greek Cypriot trainers on the whole confirmed the positions of their respective governments. Many of the interviews show that individual Greek trainers also developed a critical attitude towards the effects of the embargo in the North, partly influenced by their dialogue

with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. The conformity of the Greek Cypriot activists to their government has strengthened the position of the Cyprus government on an international level, too.

To the same extent as the Greek Cypriots feared an implicit recognition of the North the Turkish Cypriot government hoped for it. Equally one hoped on the level of bi-communal groups of businesspeople (a group founded by the Greek Cypriot businessman C. Lordos and the Turkish Cypriot businessman V. Celik which was unconnected to the groups around the Trainer Group) for a common development of economic projects which would gradually undermine the embargo). These hopes remained unfulfilled, though. Instead important ideological concepts such as the hostile image cultivated in the North of the Greek Cypriots were challenged:

“You see the establishment in the North – sometimes I think they don’t know how to go about some things. There is this concept ‘We can never live with the Greek Cypriots again’ promoted by the officials [in the North] And any kind of meeting, shared vision, any kind of joint activity, bi-communal project of course undermines this concept.” (7:19)

The slogan which almost sounds like a natural law that they could not live together with Greek Cypriots is an important corner stone for the legitimatisation of their own ethnically homogenous state. Gross hostile images like that cannot remain in a bi-communal process as in the end the other person always turns out to be another human being – in spite of all the differences.

Through their discussion groups, the Trainer Group has initiated a learning process that has had an effect on the individual participants as well as on the collective level of their social environment.<sup>30</sup> They work on the assumption that the new perceptions and attitudes that arose from the bi-communal encounters will be further communicated by the participants. Their aim is to further the social change in the relatively small Cypriot society. However, as a facilitator of this learning process the Trainer Group cannot be described as an independent political actor, but there is some understanding that they are able to influence their respective political levels with their practical work. According to many of the trainers, this was to happen indirectly by influencing foreign actors who knew of the new perceptions on the

---

<sup>30</sup> See Broome, 1998.

societal level. To the same extent as the members of the Trainer Group tried to brief foreign track-one actors of their new ideas in regard to an approach of the two societies, high ranking foreign actors have taken on the ideas, desires and demands of the grass-roots groups and carried them into the negotiation on track one level.

More than the Greek Cypriot leadership, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was increasingly confronted by remarks from the diplomacy that parts of their population were in opposition to their positions.

Apart from this, there was a debate at the end of 1997 regarding the restructuring of the Trainer Group and their rather loosely connected follow-up groups. The first concept was set up by the resident Fulbright Scholar and contained the forming of four sub-groups. These groups were:

- A facilitation group whose members would specialise in the supervision of the bi-communal groups,
- A strategic group for concepts and ideas (think-tank) whose task was mainly to carry new ideas onto the track one level or other societal initiatives such as advice for the meetings of groups of businesspeople from both sides,
- A group for public relations maintaining contacts to the media and to influence a unified presentation in the media.
- A co-ordinating council. This group was to manage the growth of the bi-communal groups and the continuous increase of its members. Apart from this it was to secure the communication and flow of information between the groups and its members and to initiate major events.

The plan was to form a labour-divided and growth orientated civil movement without any institutionalisation that could be somewhat problematic on Cyprus. In November 1997 the Cyprus Consortium held a training course for trainers in order to recruit sufficient staff for the facilitation group (New Trainers). The existing trainers were aware of the politicisation of their work because of the reform plans. The debate went on for several weeks without achieving any clear agreement. Some of the original members had withdrawn from the meetings because they found the behaviour of the Americans too “pushy”.

It was this situation at the EU summit in Luxembourg that supplied the pretext for the for the Turkish Cypriot leadership to stop all bi-communal activities at the

Ledra Palace Checkpoint by not granting any exit permits to its citizens. Since then, the members of the Trainer Group have not met. Due to the commitment of some of members and some new people new bi-communal activities have restarted. The three main developments are:

- The activities have moved from Nicosia and the Ledra Palace Checkpoint to the village of Pyla in the buffer zone which is inhabited by Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
- The US network is not or only indirectly involved in these bi-communal activities.
- There are other groups of individuals involved as the recent activities are more focused on younger people.

Pyla as a meeting place has only been used by the trainers since the instigation of the ban in 1997. As a meeting place, it is quite controversial as it is an hour-long drive from Nicosia usually after work which makes it not very suitable for the many regular meetings of the group. Apart from this, there are few suitable buildings for the groups to meet. As Pyla was considered a centre for smugglers it did not have a good reputation and the participants were closely watched by the police and the secret services. It is difficult to come up with an explanation as to why the access to the buffer zone at Pyla is tolerated but to Nicosia it is not. Very likely that the current meetings in Pyla are considered a less relevant political process because they nearly always happen at weekends only, because of the smaller numbers involved and the changed composition of the group of participants.

In spite of the awkward access, some of the bi-communal groups do meet in Pyla, such as the group affiliated with the bi-communal magazine *Hade*. Furthermore, it is the youth groups who more frequently use the village for meetings. The adolescents come partly from schools where the teachers were involved in bi-communal activities.<sup>31</sup> As early as 1996 there had been a Youth Encounter for a peace-project aiming at training young people together in conflict resolution and to initiate a network of pen friends with young people from “the other side”. Apart from this, the Fulbright Commission finances two to three youth camps

---

<sup>31</sup> For the latest developments in bi-communal affairs see: [www.peace-cyprus.org](http://www.peace-cyprus.org)

per year in the USA. During these summer-camps, the young people are partly looked after by members of the Trainer Group and are trained in Communication and Conflict Resolution. When back on Cyprus they meet fairly regularly in Pyla.

Since the beginning of 2000, the activities have increased and in March 2000 there was a major youth festival. At the end of August the young people from three summer-camps got together, and in July the Youths, together with a still very active trainer, organised a meeting of former inhabitants of bi-communal villages. This meeting was of special importance because it had the attention of the international media and again demonstrated the willingness of a large number of people to take steps towards a reconciliation.

The number of current bi-communal activities that can be associated with the members of the Trainer Group is clearly lower in extent and variety compared to 1996/97. Still, they share some characteristics that give reason for optimism. They are clearly more independent and less dependent on foreign support. For example, the Greek Cypriot businessman C. Lordos who had been involved in bi-communal activities opened a meeting place for Greek and Turkish Cypriot citizens (spring 2000). This is a definite improvement in the situation regarding bi-communal events. The organisers don't have to rely solely on the rooms of the United Nations at the Ledra Palace Hotel or at the Fulbright Commission, and they do not have to resort to meeting in public restaurants. As the Turkish Cypriot authorities have so far not closed off the access to Pyla no administrative or political interventions are necessary to guarantee the freedom of movement of Turkish Cypriots in the buffer zone. The author is of the opinion that under these conditions more and more varied bi-communal activities will be developed. If that should prove true a lot will be dependent on the reaction of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. From the point of view of the Turkish Cypriot government the potential risks we discussed earlier are still valid. Even when the danger of a politicisation of bi-communal activities by foreign actors is not so likely due to the new developments, it is possible that the Turkish Cypriot government will again resort to repressive measures and perhaps close off the free access to Pyla. Should that be the case the bi-communal activities will again be dependent on the political support of powerful foreign actors.

How can the overall achievements of the bi-communal activities been described? It can be argued that the public, particularly in the South became used to

the idea and concept of rapprochement. A hysteric-nationalistic outcry by the media, like the one just after the return of the Oxford group appears unlikely, if not impossible in today's Cyprus. This shift in attitude can be certainly related to work of the Trainer Group. Moreover, projects the Trainers Group tried to implement, like a weekly newspaper article in the press of the other community, are being realised today by newspapers on both sides. Another mayor development that can be connected to the bi-communal groups is the foundation of the "Bureau of Bi-Communal Reconciliation and Strengthening of Civil Society" by the Democratic Rally Party (DISY). It was Katie Clerides a DISY Member of Parliament, daughter of President Clerides and member of the Oxford group who pushed for the foundation of the Bureau. For the first time in its history this ruling conservative party reaches out for the Turkish Cypriot community, creating an institution and securing funding. The author considers this as a new quality in the conservative spectrum of Cypriot political life. Without the proof that there is a demand for reconciliation an institution like this never would have been created. Maybe the "visualisation" of this demand can be described as the greatest achievement of the bi-communal groups. Particularly in the South, where public opinion was very hostile to any contact with the North this is an achievement that is conducive to a settlement.

## 7 Lessons learned

In regard to the spectrum of obstacles (self-restriction and repression) actors who support the continuation of the bi-communal activities of the Trainer Group were and are necessary because they can supply the measures required.

On Cyprus for a long time this task has been carried out by the US Alliance of American actors. The shared American background has worked to the advantage of this alliance. At the same time it has caused suspicions in the Cypriot population towards this actor and the trainers associated with them. Apart from this, the work of the bi-communal civic groups has been politicised by this actor. While on the one hand this is a model for change and as such means pressure on the official negotiating parties, on the other hand it contains the risk of a manipulation of grassroots activities for reasons that are not perceivable by all participants. The question is how effective alliances of support can be formed without raising the suspicion of political bias.

The Trainer Group and its foreign supporters have not managed to institutionalise the bi-communal process or to give it a viable financial basis. This has many causes to be found among the members of the Trainer Group, with the respective governments and with the lack of political risk-taking by the participating foreign actors. In the light of the fact that the sums spent on Conflict Resolution on Cyprus amount to many millions of Dollars, it is very regrettable that no permanent Cypriot structure could be created. Empowerment in terms of skill building should be followed by structural empowerment.

The development of the Trainer Group has shown that internal actors are able to establish themselves in the same way as effective, neutral facilitators and can take on a number of Third Party functions. Within the framework of this study, some differences between internal and foreign facilitators became obvious:

On the civic level, the Trainer Group seems to achieve to initiate a “deep dialogue” but its status and political influence is not sufficient to establish itself as a facilitator on the track-one-and-a-half level. Foreign actors are able to do just this. At the same time the “1 1/2” individuals mistrust particularly the US-American

trainer/facilitators, and for that reason a deep dialogue is hardly possible. The author is convinced that the lack of trust is unconnected to the trainer's personality or the method applied, but rather with the worry of the participants that their expressions via the US network and the American negotiators become part of the official process of negotiation. This study has shown that this concern, at least on Cyprus, was not unfounded. The author is sceptical that the track-one-and-a-half measures facilitated by the Americans, especially in phases of official negotiations, can generate the same spectrum of varied and imaginative opinions as is possible in conflict resolution workshops.

The bi-communal peace-building activities posed and pose chances and risks to the two governments on Cyprus even if no political statements on behalf of the activists are made. The activities can transcend the political positions of the negotiating partners which is a main aspect of their political importance.

## Bibliography

- BICOMMUNAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION STEERING COMMITTEE CYPRUS (ed.), April 1995: Profile . Nicosia.
- BROOME, Benjamin J., 1996: Designing the Future of Peace-Building Efforts in Cyprus- Report of Design Workshop held during Fall 1994 and Spring of 1995 with Conflict Resolution Trainers and Project Leaders. Available from the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, Nicosia.
- 1997: Designing a Collective Approach to Peace: Interactive Design and Problem-Solving Workshop with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Communities in Cyprus, in: *International Negotiation* vol. 2, no. 3, 1997, pp. 381 - 407.
- 1998: Overview of Conflict Resolution Activities in Cyprus: Their Contribution To The Peace Process, in: *The Cyprus Review* vol. 10, no. 1. Spring 1998, pp. 47 - 66.
- CRAWSHAW, Nancy, 1978: The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece. London: Allen & Unwin.
- DOOB, L.W., 1974: A Cyprus workshop: an exercise in intervention methodology, in: *Journal of Social Psychology* vol. 94 (1974), pp. 161 - 178.
- 1976: A Cyprus workshop: intervention methodology during a continuing crisis, in: *Journal of Social Psychology* vol 98 (1976), pp. 143 - 44.
- FISHER, Ronald J., 1994: Education And Peacebuilding in Cyprus: A Report On Two Conflict Analysis Workshops. Saskatoon/ Canada: University of Saskatchewan (Dep. of Psychology).
- HADJIPAVLOU-TRIGEORGIS, Maria, 1993: Unofficial Intercommunal Contacts and their Contribution to Peacebuilding in Conflict Societies: The Case of Cyprus, in: *The Cyprus Review* vol. 5, no. 2, 1993, pp. 68 - 87.
- INSTITUTE FOR MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY (ed.), 1995: Initiative Report: Cyprus. 2 March 1995, Washington, D.C.: IMTD.
- MARKIDES, Kyriacos C., 1977: The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- ROTHMAN, Jay, 1999: Articulating Goals and Monitoring Progress in a Cyprus Conflict Resolution Training Workshop, in: Ross, Marc / Jay Rothman: Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorizing Success and Failure. London: Macmillan Press, pp. 176 – 194
- SALEM, Norma, 1992: The Constitution of 1960 and its Failure, in: Salem, Norma: Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- THEOPHANOUS, Andreas, 1996: The Political Economy Of A Federal Cyprus, Intercollege Press, Nicosia, p. xiii.
- UNDP, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (ed.), July 1984: Nicosia Master Plan: Final Report Executive Summary. Nicosia: UNDP, UNCHS [Habitat].
- UNHCR, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (ed.), 1995: The Nicosia Sewage Project: A Plan For Nicosia A Strategy For The World, UNHCR, Nicosia, ----- A Vision for the Future of Nicosia: A Partnership towards the Rehabilitation of Chrysaliniotissa and Arab Ahmet, UNHCR, Nicosia.
- WOLLEH, Oliver, 1998: Gesellschaftliche Vertrauensbildung: Über die schwierige Anerkennung in Zypern, in: *Gewaltfreie Aktion*, Heft 115/116, 30. Jahrg., 1. + 2. Quartal 1998.
- 2000: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen interner Akteure bei der Friedensbildung in geteilten Gesellschaften - Die Conflict Resolution Trainer Group in Zypern (1993 -1997). PhD Thesis (submitted 2000), Berlin: Free University Berlin (to be published).
- June 2001: A Civil Society Caught up in the Question of Recognition, in: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (ed.): Searching for Peace in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, (to be published).

Mono-communal Phase	Bi-communale Phase			The Conflict Resolution Trainer Group as an Internal Actor	
Greek Cypriot mono-communal Workshops					
Turkish Cypriot mono-communal Workshops	<i>Bicommunal Steering Committee</i>	<i>Design Workshop of Trainer Group</i>	<i>Conflict Resolution Trainer Group</i>		
				<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Groups of the First Phase of Proliferation</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Educators Group</i>  <i>Citizens Group</i>  <i>Federation an EU Study Group</i>  <i>Peace Concert</i>  <i>"Letters to the other side" Group</i>  <i>Technology for Peace</i>  <i>Management Group</i>  <i>Women Group</i>  <i>Young Political Leaders Group</i>  <i>Lawyers Group</i></p>	
<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>

**Groups of the Second Phase of Proliferation**

*Citizens Group II-V*  
*Brussels Women Group*  
*Co-Villager*  
*Youth Encounters for Peace*  
*Youth Environmentalists*  
*Hade Magazin*  
*Artist Group*  
*Students Group II*  
*Environmentalists*

## Berghof Reports: An Overview\*

Berghof Report	Title	Author	published
1	Friedliche Einmischung. Strukturen, Prozesse und Strategien zur konstruktiven Bearbeitung ethnopolitischer Konflikte	NORBERT ROPERS	October 1995
1	<i>Peaceful Intervention. Structures, Processes, and Strategies for the Constructive Regulation of Ethnopolitical Conflicts</i>	NORBERT ROPERS	October 1995
2	Interkulturelle Mediation – eine schwierige Vermittlung. Eine empirisch-analytische Annäherung zur Bedeutung von kulturellen Unterschieden	FRANK LIEBE (WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF NADJA GILBERT)	May 1996
2	<i>Intercultural Mediation: A Difficult Brokerage. An Empirical-Analytical Attempt to Assess the Impact of Cultural Differences</i>	FRANK LIEBE (WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF NADJA GILBERT)	May 1996
3	Konstruktive Haltungen und Verhaltensweisen in institutionellen Konflikten. Erfahrungen, Begriffe, Fähigkeiten	EVA MARINGER / REINER STEINWEG	June 1997
4	Krisenprävention und zivile Konfliktbearbeitung durch die EU. Konzepte, Kapazitäten und Kohärenzprobleme	TOBIAS DEBIEL / MARTINA FISCHER	August 2000

---

\* Publications by the Berghof Research Center can be downloaded from its homepage [www.berghof-center.org](http://www.berghof-center.org)

Berghof Report	Title	Author	published
4	<i>Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management by the European Union. Concepts, Capacities and Problems of Coherence</i>	TOBIAS DEBIEL / MARTINA FISCHER	<i>September 2000</i>
5	Friedensförderung in Bosnien-Herzegovina. Ansätze der Jugend-, Bildungs- und Kulturarbeit	MARTINA FISCHER / JULIE TUMLER	<i>September 2000</i>
6	Die soziale Eingliederung von Kindersoldaten. Konzepte und Erfahrungen aus Mosambik	PETER STEUDTNER	<i>March 2001</i>
7	Macht und Differenz. Ein erweitertes Modell der Konfliktpotentiale in interkulturellen Auseinandersetzungen	ANJA WEIß	<i>March 2001</i>
8	<i>Local Peace Constituencies in Cyprus. Citizens' Rapproachment by the bi-communal Conflict Resolution Trainer Group</i>	OLIVER WOLLEH	<i>March 2001</i>

## Occasional Papers: An Overview\*

Occasional Paper	Title	Author	published
1	Ergebnisbericht: Interkulturelle Konfliktbearbeitung. Einführungsseminar in neue Konzepte der innergesellschaftlichen und internationalen Mediation und präventiven Diplomatie. 30.November – 2. Dezember 1994	NORBERT ROPERS	July 1996 out of print
2	<i>Golitsino Workshop for Peace Builders.</i> 25. – 29. September 1995	ANJA WEISS / ALEKSEJ NAZARENKO	August 1996
3	<i>Warsaw Workshop for Peace Builders.</i> 28. Januar – 2. Februar 1996	ANJA WEISS / ALEKSEJ NAZARENKO	September 1996
4	<i>The Hungarian Concept of Autonomy for Romania. The 1993 DAHR Draft-law on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities and Reactions from Other Political Parties in Romania</i>	KINGA PÁLL	September 1996
5	<i>The International Relations of the DAHR 1989 – 96. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. An Introduction</i>	ANNA-MÁRIA BÍRÓ	August 1996
6	<i>The Protection of National Minorities and Regional Stability</i>	KINGA GÁL	September 1996
7	<i>Strategies and Needs of NGOs Dealing with Ethnopolitical Conflicts in the New Eastern Democracies</i>	ANJA WEISS / ALEKSEJ NAZARENKO	March 1997

---

\* Publications by the Berghof Research Center can be downloaded from its homepage [www.berghof-center.org](http://www.berghof-center.org)

Occasional Paper	Title	Author	published
8	Eigeninitiativen einheimischer FriedensstifterInnen. Wirkungsmöglichkeiten in den neuen östlichen Demokratien	SONJA BORSKI / HOLGER HESS	September 1998
9	<i>Ethnopolitical Legitimacy and Ethnic Conflict Management. The Case of the Russian Federation in the Early 1990s</i>	AIRAT AKLAEV	June 1996
10	<i>Peace Work by Civil Actors in Post-Communist Societies</i>	DIANA FRANCIS / NORBERT ROPERS	September 1997
11	<i>Advanced Networking: A Conceptual Approach to NGO-based Early Response Strategies in Conflict Prevention</i>	ANTON IVANOW	October 1997
12	Peacebuilding Aktivitäten der bikommunalen <i>Conflict Resolution Trainer Group</i> in Zypern	OLIVER WOLLEH	November 1997
13	<i>Natural Law, Agents and Patients, and Minority Rights</i>	GABRIEL ANDREESCU	November 1999
14	<i>Roles and Functions of Third Parties in the Constructive Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts</i>	NORBERT ROPERS	November 1997
15	<i>The Intercultural Mediation Project: The Bléré Experience: A Study of Conflict Management in an Intercultural Context</i>	JON SEBASTIAN	November 1997
16	Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung deutscher NROs und Einrichtungen – Ein Wegweiser, 1998/99	CORDULA REIMANN	September 1998

Occasional Paper	Title	Author	published
17	<i>Southeast European NGOs for the Stability Pact.</i>	MARTINA FISCHER / GIOVANNI SCOTTO	September 2000